中國文化大學【跨領域教師專業成長社群】活動紀錄表


填表日期: 108 年 6 月 4 日

| | | | 項衣日期· 108 年 6 月 4 日 |
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| 社 | | | |
| 群 | 史學理論與歷史教育讀書會 | | |
| 名 | | | |
| 稱 | | | |
| 召 | | | |
| 集 | 湯瑞弘 | 系所/職稱 | 史學系/副教授 |
| 人 | | | |
| 活 | 專題演講:《人文學科的逆襲》(You Can Do Anything: The Surprising Power of a "Useless" Liberal Arts Education)一書導讀 | | |
| 動 | | | |
| 主 | | | |
| 題 | | | |
| 活 | | | |
| 動 | 108 年 6 月 1 日 | 活動地點 | 台北市中山女高逸仙樓2樓會議室 |
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| 期 | | | |
| 活 | | | 社群出席成員: 人 |
| 動 | 12 時 10 分至 16 時 30 分 | 與會人數 | |
| 時 | | | 非社群出席成員: 人 |
| 間 | | | |
| 活動 | 史學系教師專業成長社群於 108 年 6 月 1 日邀請佛光大學歷史系范純武教授做專題演 | | |
| 報 | 講,題目為「《人文學科的逆襲》(You Can Do Anything: The Surprising Power of | | |
| 導 | | | |
| (活 | a "Useless" Liberal Arts Education)一書導讀」。在演講中,范教授結合理論與 | | |
| 動方 | | | |
| 式或 | 實務並以自身在教學現場豐富的教學經驗,對於如何以創新的教學方式提昇學生的學 | | |
| 內容 | | | |
| 簡 | 習成效,提出精闢的見解,並且在演講之後與出席的老師分享和交流彼此的經驗。 | | |
| 述) | 日次次 1,2017,1617,1017 亚土工人所之及兴山市中7-5147,1747,1743 | | |
| | 透過本次的演講活動,增加本系教師與他校教師交流的機會,發揮相互學習之功 | | |
| 執 | 精進教師之專業發展,提升教師教學品質,強化學生學習成效。 | | |
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演講活動

演講活動



演講活動



演講活動

- 1. 請於每次活動結束後一周內,將相關憑證及本表,併同文宣品、講義資料、簽到單、照片或影音檔等,送交本中心辦理經費核銷。
- 2. 本表如不敷使用,請自行以 A4 用紙依規格增列欄位,如有相關活動文宣亦請提供。

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張河位

打窩雞地

杨秀教

强松级



Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal

citation: Preston, Stephanie D. and de Waal, Frans B. M. (2001) Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.

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Short abstract:

Our proximate and ultimate model of empathy integrates diverse theories, reconciles conflicting definitions, and generates specific predictions. Focusing on the evolution of perception-action processes connects empathy with more basic phenomena such as imitation, group alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, and mother-infant responsiveness. The latter, shared across species that live in groups, have profound effects on reproductive success. Perception-action processes are accordingly the driving force in the evolution of empathy. With the more recent evolutionary expansion of prefrontal functioning, these basic processes have been augmented to support more cognitive forms of empathy.



A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative

William Cronon

Children, only animals live entirely in the Here and Now. Only nature knows neither memory nor history. But man—let me offer you a definition—is the storytelling animal. Wherever he goes he wants to leave behind not a chaotic wake, not an empty space, but the comforting marker-buoys and trail-signs of stories. He has to go on telling stories. He has to keep on making them up. As long as there's a story, it's all right. Even in his last moments, it's said, in the split second of a fatal fall—or when he's about to drown—he sees, passing rapidly before him, the story of his whole life.

-Graham Swift, Waterland

In the beginning was the story. Or rather: many stories, of many places, in many voices, pointing toward many ends.

In 1979, two books were published about the long drought that struck the Great Plains during the 1930s. The two had nearly identical titles: one, by Paul Bonnifield, was called *The Dust Bowl*; the other, by Donald Worster, *Dust Bowl*.¹ The two authors dealt with virtually the same subject, had researched many of the same documents, and agreed on most of their facts, and yet their conclusions could hardly have been more different.


Bonnifield's closing argument runs like this:

William Cronon is professor of history at Yale University.

I would like to thank the many friends and colleagues who have read and criticized various versions of this essay. David Laurence was responsible for convincing me, rather against my will, that the perspective I've adopted here could be neither ignored nor evaded, and he offered generous guidance as I tried to acquire the critical vocabulary that would allow me to tackle these problems. As always, David Scobey has been my most faithful guide in helping me find my way through the dense thickets of literary theory. Comments and suggestions from Thomas Bender, Elise Broach, Robert Burt, Michael P. Cohen, James Davidson, David Brion Davis, Kai Erikson, Ann Fabian, Peter Gay, Amy Green, Michael Goldberg, Ramachandra Guha, Reeve Huston, Susan Johnson, Howard Lamar, Jonathan Lear, Patricia Limerick, Arch McCallum, George Miles, Katherine Morrissey, Jim O'Brien, Robert Shulman, Thompson Smith, Alan Taylor, Paul Taylor, Sylvia Tesh, Thompson Webb III, Timothy Weiskel, Richard White, Bryan Wolf, Donald Worster, and two anonymous readers likewise helped shape my thoughts on this subject. Finally, I owe a special debt to David Thelen and Steven Stowe for their persistence in encouraging me to return to an essay I had all but abandoned. I am grateful to all.

The opening quotation is from Graham Swift, Waterland (New York, 1983), 53-54.

¹ Paul Bonnifield, The Dust Bowl: Men, Dirt, and Depression (Albuquerque, 1979); Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York, 1979). On Dust Bowl historiography in general, see the collection of essays in Great Plains Quarterly, 6 (Spring 1986).



The neural underpinnings of empathy and their relevance for collective emotions

Claus Lamm (1), Giorgia Silani (2)

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Preprint of:

Lamm, C., & Silani, G. (2014). The neural underpinnings of empathy and their relevance for collective emotions. In C. Scheve & M. Salmella (Eds.), <u>Collective Emotions</u>, Oxford University Press.

Abstract:

Empathy, the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person, is a crucial component of successful social interaction. Recent models of empathy originating from the field of social neuroscience propose that different components contribute to the experience of empathy. These include a) a sensory-driven component that can entail an automatic experiential sharing of the affect of others, b) a cognitive component, which enables the regulation as well as the deliberate elicitation of empathy by means of mechanisms such as perspective taking, and c) self-awareness and self-other distinction, which enable the empathic observer to disentangle vicarious from self-related emotional responses. The present chapter reviews the mechanisms underlying these components from a neuroscientific view, and discusses how this might contribute to a better understanding of collective emotions.

Keywords:

empathy, social neuroscience, fMRI, perspective taking, emotion regulation, prosocial behavior

It might not be smart to start with a negative statement, but let's face it: social neuroscience has so far not been able to make substantial contributions to our understanding of collective emotions. This lack of insights by no means stems from a lack of interest into this fascinating phenomenon. The suspected culprit rather are conceptual and methodological constraints of this emerging discipline, which despite carrying the word "social" in its name